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Article
Incenting Flexibility:
The Relationship Between Public Law and Voluntary
Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance
RACHEL ARNOW-RICHMAN
This Article examines the significance of the 4/40 work week to caregivers
in need of individualized workplace accommodation. Employer interest in
4/40 and other alternative work structures demonstrates that the current
organization of market work is not inevitable and that its re-organization in
ways that facilitate full participation by caregivers can sometimes be mutually
beneficial. Yet it is unlikely that employers act optimally in responding to
individual accommodation requests. Well-known limits on rational choice
theory can impede supervisors’ ability to determine whether a particular
accommodation will effectively enable the caregiver to perform her job and
whether the costs entailed in adopting the accommodation will be outweighed
by other savings. Thus, it is likely that some number of viable, cost-effective
accommodations are not being implemented by employers.
This Article argues that the law should play a role in facilitating optimal,
individualized accommodation of working caregivers. Drawing on existing
and pending legislation, it argues for the creation of a statutory “right to
request” that would protect workers from retaliation for seeking
accommodations and would require employers to consider such requests in
good faith. By encouraging workers to come forward with their requests and
requiring parties to engage in an “interactive process,” the law can
potentially reduce some of the biases and informational gaps that currently
plague discretionary employer decisions about accommodation requests. In
this way, such a law may ultimately inspire mutually beneficial changes to
work structure that would not have been achieved absent legal intervention.
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Incenting Flexibility:
The Relationship Between Public Law and Voluntary
Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance
RACHEL ARNOW-RICHMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
A central feature of market work is employers’ expectation that fulltime workers will perform eight hours per day, five days per week, and onsite at the employer’s facility. Legal scholars concerned with the position
of working caregivers have critiqued this “full-time face-time” (“FTFT”)
norm as reflecting the life patterns of men who generally require no time
off for childrearing and can depend on a steady stream of unpaid domestic
labor supplied by a female spouse.1 Despite the rhetorical power of this
claim, mainstream work structures like the FTFT norm have proved
particularly difficult to eradicate through legal regulation. Even in areas
where the law actually compels firms to alter their employment practices
for the benefit of nontraditional workers, truly transformative changes are
quite rare. For instance, under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”),2 which requires employers to reasonably accommodate disabled
workers, courts have often treated the FTFT norm as a backstop that limits
what types of workplace accommodations will be considered reasonable.3
*
Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; J.D., Harvard Law
School; L.L.M., Temple University School of Law. I am grateful for the assistance and feedback
received from W. David Barnes, Diane Burkhardt, Emily Grabham, Eli Wald, and the Colorado
Employment Law Faculty (“CELF”) Scholarship Group (Roberto Corrada, Melissa Hart, Martin Katz,
Scott Moss, Helen Norton, Nantiya Ruan, Raja Raghunath, and Catherine Smith). Special thanks to
student research assistants Geoffrey Frazier, Sarah Millard, and Lindsay Noyce.
1
Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283, 359
(2003) (discussing the disparate impact on women of “full-time face-time” work requirements in the
context of telecommuting); see also JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 64–66, 113 (2000) (describing how market work is structured
around an ideal worker who has no household or caregiving responsibilities).
2
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006).
3
See, e.g., Denczak v. Ford Motor Co., 215 Fed. App’x 442, 445 (6th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that
“[c]ommon sense, to say nothing of [defendant’s] business judgment, supports the point” that a
production quota in an assembly line is an essential function of a welding job because such positions
“are only as fast as the slowest member of the production team”); Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205
F.3d 1301, 1303–06 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a utility company was not required to limit an
employee’s hours to eight hours per day because mandatory overtime was an essential function of the
job); Davis v. Microsoft Corp., 37 P.3d 333, 337 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a software
company was not required to accommodate plaintiff by allowing him to work a forty-hour week where
the unrebutted evidence demonstrated “that all systems engineers within the department had
consistently worked 60–80 hours per week for years”); see also Rachel Arnow-Richman,
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Recent changes by some employers, however, call into question the
inviolate nature of current work structures. Several companies and
government employers have instituted or proposed compressed work
weeks and other forms of alternative scheduling to deal with budgetary
shortfalls in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008.4 Most such
initiatives tinker at the edges of the FTFT norm. For example, a plan
announced by the Utah state government in June 2008 requires state
employees to maintain the same number of full-time hours, but spreads
their work over fewer days (the so-called “4/40” week).5 Employees
benefit by obtaining one full weekday “off” per week.6 Such changes are
far from the wholesale reform of market work that some legal scholars
have envisioned.7 These voluntary initiatives, however, have been touted
as both efficiency-enhancing for employers and supportive of the life and
family needs of employees.8 Moreover, they are voluntary undertakings
that have emerged absent legal compulsion and outside the discourse over
equal employment quality for caregivers.
Accommodation Subverted: The Future of Work/Family Initiative in a “Me, Inc.” World, 12 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 345, 363–67 (2003) (describing this phenomenon and discussing cases in which courts
limit the reach of individualized accommodation under the ADA); Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the
Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 23–36
(2005) (providing examples of courts refusing to require accommodations that varied employees’
hours, punctuality, attendance, start and stop times, and on-site work requirements).
4
See Colleen McCarthy, Employers Offer Benefits To Offset Higher Fuel Prices, BUS. INS., Sept.
1, 2008, at 27 (reporting survey results finding that twenty-two percent of employer respondents
planned to offer a four-day work week option to at least some employees); Josée Valcourt & Justin
Scheck, Oil Prices Prompt Four-Day Week, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2008, at A3 (describing various
states’ efforts to reduce the work week to four days “to provide relief from the cost of commuting”); cf.
Hannah Seligson, An Alternative to Layoffs: The Shorter Workweek, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, at
BU11 (detailing a New York policy center’s switch of some employees to a three-day, twenty-fourhour work week at reduced pay).
5
See Brock Vergakis, Utah’s 4-Day Workweek Draws Out-of-State Attention, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 25, 2009 (explaining that under Utah’s four-day work week, 17,000 state employees now
work four ten-hour days each week).
6
See STATE OF UTAH, WORKING 4 UTAH: INITIATIVE PERFORMANCE REPORT, FINAL 16 (2009),
available at http://www.dhrm.utah.gov/Working4Utah_FinalReport_Dec2009.pdf (showing that, based
on employee survey results, almost seventy-five percent of respondents prefer the four-day work
week); 4-Day Workweek Creates New Volunteers in Utah, USA TODAY, July 10, 2009,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-07-10-utah-volunteers_N.htm (reporting that the “extra
day off” allows employees an opportunity to engage in volunteer activities).
7
See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1941 (2000) (envisioning a vast
overhaul of market work in which “the state sustains suitable work for everyone: providing jobs,
guaranteeing a living wage, cultivating empowering working conditions and relations, restructuring
working time, and providing the job-holding services necessary to allow people to pursue paid work
along with broader care commitments and civic activities”); Vicki Schultz & Allison Hoffman, The
Need for a Reduced Workweek in the United States, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN, AND THE NEW
ECONOMY: THE CHALLENGE TO LEGAL NORMS 131, 140–41 (Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owens eds.,
2006) (proposing far-reaching changes to the American work environment, including a reduction of the
standard work week from forty hours to thirty-five hours for all employees).
8
See Vergakis, supra note 5 (reporting that Utah’s four-day work week initiative would cut
greenhouse gas emissions and reduce gasoline consumption, and finding that “the schedule offers more
flexibility” for affected employees); McCarthy, supra note 4 (describing the compressed work week as
one of “a variety of benefits to alleviate the impact of higher gasoline prices”).
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What does the emergence of an employer-initiated, 4/40 week mean
for working caregivers? What does it mean to scholars seeking to alter the
structure of market work through legal reform? This Article examines this
trend through the lens of individual accommodation—workers’ need for
and employers’ willingness to provide idiosyncratic changes in job
requirements or workplace structures to meet the demands of particular
caregivers. From the perspective of these workers, voluntary 4/40 is
potentially, though not inherently, transformative. Its emergence illustrates
the viability of win-win accommodations that benefit both caregivers and
their employers. At least in some cases, the interests of caregivers and
traditional workers elide.9
At the same time, however, voluntary 4/40 reminds us that employees
in an at-will system remain subject at all times to employers’ unilateral
changes in work structure—a reality that may more heavily burden
caregivers whose personal responsibilities are likely to be scheduledependent. The inherent limitation of 4/40, or any other employersponsored reform, is that such initiatives are neither motivated by, nor
comprehensive of, the needs of working caregivers. For voluntary
restructuring efforts to constitute an effective, long-term component of a
larger reform agenda, as this Article contends they must, employers must
undertake those efforts in response to employee demands and not solely in
response to catastrophic financial circumstances, like those currently
facing many state governments.
This Article argues that the law has a role both in encouraging and
mediating this type of voluntary and individualized accommodation. It
argues for the creation of statutory procedural rights that enable and protect
caregivers in seeking alternative work arrangements. This approach has
been adopted successfully abroad10 and has been proposed domestically in
9
Legal scholarship has long emphasized such synergies. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Canaries in
the Mine: Work/Family Conflict and the Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2221, 2227 (2002) (arguing that
“the business case for providing usable part-time programs demonstrates that the savings attributable to
reduced attrition far outweigh any arguable higher overhead”); Joan C. Williams, The Family-Hostile
Corporation, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 921, 924 (2002) (same); Joan C. Williams, The Politics of Time
in the Legal Profession, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 379, 398–403 (2007) (arguing “the business case for
work-life balance in the legal profession”); Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal
Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S
L.J. 77, 85–89 (2003) (making the business case for “family-responsive policies”); cf. Michelle A.
Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with Disabilities Act Benefits
Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 311–14 (2009) (summarizing how non-disabled
workers stand to benefit from employer accommodation of disabled individuals).
10
See, e.g., Employment Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/
acts2002/pdf/ukpga_20020022_en.pdf (giving British parents of children under the age of seventeen
the right to request flexible work); Employment Relations (Flexible Working Arrangements)
Amendment Act 2007, No. 105, Public Act, Part 6AA (N.Z.), available at http://www.legislation.govt.
nz/act/public/2007/0105/latest/DLM1034656.html?search=ts_act_Flexible+working_noresel&p=1
(granting New Zealand employees “a statutory right to request a variation of their working
arrangements if they have the care of any person”). A study of a similar German law concluded that
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11

a pending congressional bill. Its ultimate effectiveness, however, will
depend on regulatory and judicial interpretation of the scope of employers’
procedural obligations. Thus, this Article contends that such legislation
should be understood to impose an employer obligation to engage in a
good faith “interactive process”12 when faced with an explicit
accommodation request by an individual caregiver.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II situates voluntary 4/40 within
the context of existing legal regulation pertaining to the status of working
caregivers. It demonstrates that 4/40 suffers the weaknesses associated
with fixed mandates, such as the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”),
which are not flexible enough to account for individual needs. Part III
makes the case for legislation aimed at inspiring voluntary behavior at the
individual level, exploring the basic economics of voluntary
accommodations decisions. It suggests that well-known limits on rational
choice theory may lead to sub-optimal voluntary accommodation of
individual requests. Part IV demonstrates how the law may respond to
these limitations, and uses the pending Working Families Flexibility Act as
an illustration. This Article concludes that a modest and carefully
developed procedural right requiring employers to consider caregiver
accommodation requests in good faith is likely to inspire beneficial and
cost-effective changes to work structure that might not have been achieved
absent legal intervention.
II. VOLUNTARY 4/40 AND THE LEGAL PROTECTION
OF WORKING CAREGIVERS
The emergence of 4/40 is particularly propitious given the state of the
workplace reform movement. The project of advancing the position of
caregivers and other non-traditional workers through legal rule making has
achieved much over the last three decades.13 It is unclear, however, how
nine out of ten requests were accepted by employers, while a study of a comparable Dutch law found
that six out of ten requests for reduced working time were fully accepted and one out of ten was
partially accepted. See Ariane Hegewisch, Employers and European Flexible Working Rights: When
the Floodgates Were Opened, WORKLIFE LAW (UC Hastings College of the Law, S.F., Cal.), Fall
2005, at 2, available at http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/WLL/european_issue_brief_printversion.
pdf.
11
See Working Families Flexibility Act, H.R. 1274, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing a bill “to
permit employees to request, and to ensure employers consider requests for, flexible work terms and
conditions”).
12
Employers are currently compelled to do this in the disability accommodation context. See
Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o)(3) (2009) (“To determine the appropriate
reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive
process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process
should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable
accommodations that could overcome those limitations.”); see also infra Part IV.
13
Key developments in achieving greater inclusion and equal treatment of working caregivers
include the passage of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006), and the
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much more reform can be achieved through legal channels, particularly
with respect to those disparities that result from long-standing structural
features of work and other “unconscious” behaviors or practices.14 For this
reason, voluntary action by employers emerges as a natural focus for
furthering the goal of equal employment quality for non-traditional
workers. The question for legal scholars is whether such efforts will be
initiated, implemented, and maintained solely by employers motivated by
financial interests, or whether the law has a role in directing those efforts
toward the interests of caregivers and ensuring they are actually served.
This section sets the stage for that question. It argues that 4/40
programs offer some of the benefits associated with mandated benefits
legislation, but suffer from the same limitation: a lack of flexibility
necessary to address the unique needs of particular workers.
A. A Taxonomy of Legal Protections
Legal interventions to benefit working caregivers in the United States
have come in two forms—anti-discrimination laws and mandated benefits
laws—and can be associated with two distinct reform strategies.15 The
first, anti-discrimination laws (and their strategic use in litigation), aims to
eradicate stereotypes and other forms of conscious or unconscious bias that
result in differential treatment of caregivers under existing workplace rules
and practices. Laws embodying this approach include the federal
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”)16 and, at the state level, laws that
directly prohibit discrimination on the basis of “family responsibilities.”17
development of the “family responsibilities” discrimination theory, which has been recognized by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Enforcement Guidance. See EEOC,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING
RESPONSIBILITIES (2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html [hereinafter
EEOC Enforcement Guidance] (describing situations in which disparate treatment of caregivers may
constitute unlawful disparate treatment on the basis of gender).
14
This problem of structural discrimination, or what I have referred to in earlier writing as
“structural exclusion,” has become a principal concern of legal scholars focusing on the eradication of
employment discrimination. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics:
Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 91
(2003) (indicating that “discrimination often operates in the workplace today less as a blanket policy or
discrete, identifiable decision to exclude than as a perpetual tug on opportunity and advancement”);
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 458, 468–74 (2001) (describing the problem of “second generation discrimination” as “patterns of
interaction among groups within the workplace that, over time, exclude nondominant groups”). On the
challenges of eradicating the disparate effects of structural exclusion through legal rule making, see
Lindsa Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 476,
485–92 (2000); Sturm, supra, at 475–78.
15
I set forth this binary framework in greater detail in a prior article. Rachel Arnow-Richman,
Public Law and Private Process: Toward an Incentivized Organizational Justice Model of Equal
Employment Quality for Caregivers, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 25, 36–44 (2007).
16
The PDA is an amendment to Title VII providing that discrimination on the basis of “sex”
includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
17
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (2008) (making “parenthood” a protected characteristic
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These measures prohibit differential treatment under employers’ existing
standards and practices and are critical to ensuring that caregivers who are
able to perform on par with traditional workers are treated equally.
By and large, however, such efforts do not address the needs of those
caregivers who require some deviation in existing standards to
accommodate the demands of their families.18 The second approach,
mandated benefits laws and related accommodation strategies, seeks to fill
that gap. These laws require employers to adopt or alter certain practices
to address particular needs. The principal example of this approach on the
federal level is the FMLA, which grants eligible workers twelve weeks of
unpaid leave upon the birth or adoption of a child or to care for a family
member with a serious health condition.19 Several states go further,
providing some paid leave for FMLA-qualifying events;20 extending
unpaid leave to routine parental activities, such as participating in schoolrelated activities;21 and requiring employers to provide distinct benefits
such as lactation rooms for breastfeeding mothers.22 As these examples
under an unlawful employment practices statute); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2010) (prohibiting
discrimination in employment on the basis of “family responsibilities”). While federal law does not
directly protect caregivers as a class, the prohibition on gender discrimination has been used
strategically to achieve such results in some instances. See Williams & Segal, supra note 9, at 122–61
(laying out a strategy for pursuing “family responsibilities discrimination” as gender discrimination and
offering successful case examples).
18
Several scholars have criticized the anti-discrimination approach to rectifying caregiver
exclusion on these and similar grounds. See, e.g., Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment
Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal
Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 386–87 (2001) (critiquing liberal theory and equality norms as
incapable of addressing the women’s disproportionate caregiving responsibilities and their detrimental
effects on women’s participation in market work); Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for
Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16–40
(2010) (comparing European and American family leave policy and criticizing “the unintended
consequences of antidiscrimination law’s role in addressing work-family conflict in the United States”).
19
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2006). Although not the focus of this Article, the FMLA also
covers a worker’s leave to care for her own serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D)
(2006). More recently, the FMLA was amended to provide leave for workers to attend to personal
responsibilities occasioned by the deployment of a family member serving in the military. 29
U.S.C.A. § 2612(a)(1)(E) (West 2009).
20
See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 3300–3301 (West 2004) (providing an eligible employee
up to six weeks of wage replacement benefits when taking time off work to care for a seriously ill
child, spouse, parent, domestic partner, or to bond with a minor child within one year of the birth or
placement of the child in connection with foster care or adoption).
21
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 52D(a)–(b)(1) (West 2004) (granting eligible
employees twenty-four hours of school-related leave during any twelve-month period to “participate in
school activities directly related to the educational advancement of a son or daughter of the employee,
such as parent-teacher conferences or interviewing for a new school”); see also Kirsten K. Davis,
Extending the Vision: An Empowerment Identity Approach to Work-Family Regulation as Applied to
School Involvement Leave Statutes, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. (forthcoming 2010) (contrasting
the level of accommodation among ten states and the District of Columbia that currently have school
involvement leave legislation).
22
See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1030–31 (West 2002) (requiring employers to provide a reasonable
amount of break time to accommodate employees wishing to express milk at work and requiring the
employer to make “reasonable efforts to provide the employee with the use of a room or other
location . . . for the employee to express milk in private”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-20-2 (West 2009)
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suggest, mandated benefits laws that target working caregivers are similar
to, though not co-extensive with, accommodation laws that seek to rectify
disparities in the employment quality of caregivers. Under mandated
benefits laws, workers who meet a set of qualifying conditions obtain a
particular benefit (or accommodation) that other workers do not.
Depending on how narrowly the eligible group is defined, the benefit looks
less like a universal entitlement and more like an accommodation. Thus,
the FMLA identifies workers with a new child or seriously ill family
member as one protected group. This group is arguably broader than the
group benefited under state parental involvement legislation (parents of
school-aged children who engage in particular, qualifying school
activities), and that group is broader than the group benefited under state
lactation laws (breastfeeding mothers).
This characterization of mandated benefits laws, however, differs in
significant ways from the common notion of accommodation, which is
drawn largely from the law of disability accommodation.23 Unlike
reasonable accommodation, which is required in that context, mandated
benefits laws are inflexible. Thus, the FMLA benefits the worker who
wants—and is financially able—to take twelve unpaid weeks to care for a
newborn. It does not serve the interests of the worker who prefers—or is
compelled financially—to immediately re-enter the workplace following
childbirth but would like to use her leave time to work a reduced schedule.
Neither does it allow that same worker to return to work full-time and use
her leave to take three unpaid breaks per day to pump breast milk.24
To be clear, my critique here resonates with, but is distinct from, longstanding concerns about the reach and scope of the FMLA. Legal scholars
have expressed significant frustration with the limits of the FMLA in terms
of how much leave it provides, the limited purposes for which leave is
authorized, and the fact that it is unpaid.25 I share the view that three
months of unpaid leave merely scratches the surface in terms of what a
(requiring employers to provide a clean and private space, excluding a bathroom, near the employee’s
workspace, in addition to flexible break times, for nursing employees to express milk); see also Lara
M. Gardner, A Step Toward True Equality in the Workplace: Requiring Employer Accommodation for
Breastfeeding Women, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 259, 284–85 (2002) (discussing various state law
mandates as to the level of workplace accommodation for breastfeeding mothers).
23
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (defining the term “discriminate” to include “not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability”).
24
While the FMLA does allow for “intermittent leave,” the employer must allow such leave only
when “medically necessary” due to the serious health condition of the employee or a covered family
member. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.203 (2009).
25
See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 237 (describing the FMLA as a “drop in the bucket”);
Lisa Bornstein, Inclusions and Exclusions in Work-Family Policy: The Public Values and Moral Code
Embedded in the Family and Medical Leave Act, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77, 81 (2000) (“[B]y
providing only emergency or short-term coverage . . . the benefits provided by the [FMLA] are more
symbolic than they are real.”).
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primary caregiver needs following the birth or adoption of a new child.26
My point, however, is that even for those workers for whom three months
of total leave time is adequate, the law does not grant the worker the
flexibility to use that entitlement in the way that he or she might find it
most helpful.27 To obtain that type of accommodation, one would require
either very tailored, detailed rules or an open-ended reasonable
accommodation mandate like that which exists under the ADA. Figure 1
demonstrates the relationship between these rules and strategies.
Figure 1

On the far left side is the broad equality principle of federal antidiscrimination law that requires gender parity, but neither protects
caregivers per se nor accommodates that activity. Family responsibility
discrimination laws go one step further, explicitly making caregivers a
protected class, but still requiring nothing more than equal treatment. The
FMLA represents the jump to a mandated benefits approach, providing a
fixed benefit for two discrete caregiving needs. To the right of the FMLA
are state laws that create greater flexibility for caregivers, focusing on the
longer term, day-to-day burdens of caregiving, such as the need to
breastfeed infants or manage and participate in a child’s schooling.
There is, however, a natural limit to the details with which caregiving
benefits can be legislated. Setting aside the important question of how
26
See Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 834, 845 (2002) (noting that
“twelve weeks falls far short of what child development experts believe is minimally necessary” for
post-partum recovery).
27
For additional examples of how statutory inflexibility renders FMLA benefits of limited
usefulness to some caregivers, see Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process, supra note 15, at
31–36.
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such mandates would be funded, it is unclear how law makers would
extend laws like school involvement legislation to provide workers with
the requisite flexibility to accommodate all of the particular needs of their
families without creating a highly complex and unwieldy system of rules.
The recent Military Leave Amendments to the FMLA offer a telling
counter-example. Passed with little fanfare or public attention as part of
the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008,28 these amendments
require employers to provide FMLA leave to employees experiencing a
“qualifying exigency” as a result of a family member serving or called to
active duty in the Armed Forces.29 The regulations interpreting this
provision define “qualifying exigency” with incredible breadth and detail.
Included are personal responsibilities attending to a short-term
deployment, participation or attendance at military events or ceremonies,
arranging alternative childcare or providing emergency childcare as a result
of deployment, making personal financial or legal arrangements relating to
deployment, sharing rest and relaxation time with service members on
leave, and involvement in post-deployment activities.30 The regulations
then further define each of these categories of exigencies.31
The military amendments illustrate the type of forethought and detailed
drafting that would be necessary to fully address the situation of working
caregivers through legal rule making. One might be tempted to view these
amendments as blueprints for more comprehensive and inclusive work/life
legislation for civilian caregivers.32 The military amendments, however,
apply to a tiny swath of the working population (only family members of
military personnel), are triggered by one particular life event (deployment
or active duty), and provide a single form of accommodation (unpaid
leave). It is a far different problem to provide varied and flexible benefits
for the wide range of needs faced by ordinary working caregivers, which
might be best addressed though temporary or permanent schedule changes,
alterations of work structures or other accommodations short of, or in
addition to, leave time.33 Moreover, the military amendments were passed
28

Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 585 (2008).
29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(a)(1)(E) (West 2009).
29 CFR § 825.126(a) (2009).
31
Id.
32
See Marcy Karin, Time Off for Military Families: An Emerging Case Study in a Time of
War . . . And the Tipping Point for Future Laws Supporting Work-Life Balance?, 33 RUTGERS L. REC.
46, 48 (2009) (questioning whether the amendments “represent a paradigm shift in the way legislators
(and society) think about work-life policy”).
33
Scholars from different fields have noted the challenges faced by regulators in designing
optimal rules. See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing
Private Management To Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 703–04 (2003) (suggesting
that the transaction costs involved in researching, selecting, and implementing legal rules may make it
difficult for law makers to devise highly detailed rules that appropriately balance social benefits and
costs to firms and that retain sufficient flexibility to account for future change); see also Sturm, supra
note 14, at 475 (“Any rule specific enough to guide behavior will inadequately account for the
29
30
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in a unique political climate, when national attention was focused on the
War on Terror and the need to support American troops.34 Therefore,
while I am reasonably optimistic that the military amendments will prove
successful for their narrow purpose,35 I do not believe they provide a
realistic blueprint for broadly dealing with work/life conflict.
The alternative, and arguably more suitable, method for legislating
accommodation, given the nuanced needs of a heterogeneous population, is
through a reasonable accommodation mandate. Although proposed by
some scholars,36 this tack has not been seriously pursued as a strategic
matter, likely due to the documented resistance of employers to the
reasonable accommodation mandate of the ADA.37 The principal
objection to this portion of the ADA has been the costs imposed on
employers, and that argument no doubt would be levied, not without
legitimacy, in the context of any regulation requiring accommodation of
non-traditional workers, whatever its form.38 Setting that policy choice
aside, however, there are additional problems that come with an openended standard. Such rules engender significant legal uncertainty about
the scope of the mandate and the means of compliance, creating a high risk
of litigation and making it costly for employers to comply.39 This would
be even more true in the case of reasonable accommodation of caregivers
variability, change, and complexity characteristic of second generation [discrimination] problems.”).
34
See Karin, supra note 32, at 52 (acknowledging that the adoption of the Military Leave
Amendments “was possible because of the nature of the group protected and the fact that America is at
war”).
35
To date, there has been no case law interpreting the Military Leave Amendments nor any
empirical research on their implementation or effect.
36
See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 18, at 457–59; Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine
Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-Family Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations,
2001 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1445–48.
37
See Krieger, Afterword, supra note 14, at 504 (describing backlash against the ADA as
privileging the disabled at the expense of mainstream workers).
38
The cost implications of the ADA, and accommodation mandates more broadly, is a vast
subject that falls outside the scope of this Article. For extensive discussion of these issues, see John J.
Donahue III, Understanding the Reasons for and Impact of Legislatively Mandated Benefits for
Selected Workers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 897, 899–903 (2001); Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson,
Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans
with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 317–19 (2001); Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates,
53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 225–28 (2000); Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability
Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79, 167–78 (2003).
39
See Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accomodation of Workplace
Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 1197, 1254–55 (2003) (discussing the nebulous quality of the
language of the ADA, which “provides only a general structure for analysis and gives little guidance to
help define its scope and limits”); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990: Title I and Its Impact on Employment Decisions, 16 VT. L. REV. 263, 282–87 (1991) (discussing
cases litigating the meaning of “reasonable accommodation” in the ADA and the difficulty this
standard imposes on employer compliance). Cf. Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line:
Determining When an Employer’s Financial Hardship Becomes “Undue” Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391, 397 (1995) (criticizing vagueness of the undue hardship
standard, which presents employers with an uncertain backdrop against which to make decisions to
accommodate).
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than it is currently in the context of disability accommodations. Like the
beneficiaries of the FMLA Military Leave Amendments, disabled
individuals comprise a relatively discrete group of workers as compared to
the universe of workers who will likely face conflicts between work and
family caregiving.40
In short, assuming that we would even want to force employers to
make comprehensive changes, one might question the feasibility of using
legal rules to achieve that end. For these reasons, it would be unrealistic to
expect a comprehensive legal response to the structure of market work and
its effect on working caregivers.
B. The Rise of Voluntary Accommodation
If comprehensive legal reform of market work is unlikely, voluntary
accommodation becomes a necessary and indeed, inevitable bridge
between the types of changes that some scholars would like to achieve and
the reality of what regulators can do through legislative action. The
question is how useful will employer-sponsored accommodation be for the
population that most needs it.
One way to speculate about this question is by looking at 4/40 as an
example. Within the schema laid out above, 4/40—and other forms of
compressed work weeks—analogize best to mandated benefits laws that
provide a discrete and defined accommodation (one additional day off per
week). They also suffer from some of the same limitations that are
endemic to those statutes when judged from the perspective of caregivers.
On a practical level, 4/40 is invaluable to the worker who needs a full day
away from her job to care for a child or an aging parent. It is not helpful,
and in fact places additional burdens on the worker who is unable to find
child or elder care during the early and late hours that a 4/40 work week
requires.41 Furthermore, a universal 4/40 plan can create a more difficult
environment for caregivers seeking different or additional
accommodations. An employer may feel justified in rejecting an
employee’s request, however necessary or reasonable, given the
company’s adoption of what many would consider a generous and
employee-friendly work schedule.
40

The 2008 amendments to the ADA expanded the universe of protected employees. See Alex B.
Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 218 (2008) (explaining changes to the
definition of disability). The protected population remains small, however, compared to the population
of working caregivers.
41
See STATE OF UTAH, WORKING 4 UTAH, INITIATIVE PERFORMANCE REPORT, INTERIM DRAFT
13 (2009), available at http://www.utah.gov/governor/docs/Working4UtahInterimReport.pdf
[hereinafter WORKING 4 UTAH INTERIM DRAFT] (stating that twelve percent of survey respondents in
the Utah program reported a negative impact on childcare after implementation of the four-day work
week).
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That said, whenever an employer takes a creative approach to work
structure, caregivers will likely (although not invariably) reap some
benefit. In the case of a company that adopts a 4/40 work week, there will
doubtlessly be a subset of working caregivers for whom one work day off
per week obviates the need for special accommodations. Thus, a caregiver
may be able to schedule family medical appointments, children’s carpools,
or parent/teacher conferences on the non-work day in lieu of leaving work
early on particular days or taking time off from work.42 The more
generous the new form of work is—not just a reduction in days, but a
reduction in hours; not just a reduction in hours, but enhanced flexibility in
scheduling hours—the more fluid the norms of the workplace, and the
more likely it is that scholars can begin to do away with thinking about
caregivers as a unique class at all.43
But until that day arrives, legal scholars must contend with this
question of individual needs.
Currently, individual workplace
accommodation issues—outside the disability context—are left largely to
private resolution. Despite this, voluntary accommodations do occur. In
the ADA context, where employers are obligated only to reasonably
accommodate, research demonstrates that firms frequently grant more
generous accommodations than the law requires and often to employees
other than those who are legally protected.44 To some extent, this may be
explained as a rational response to legal uncertainty. Particularly in the
context of tailored mandates, like reasonable accommodation, employers
will over-comply to reduce the risk of liability or simply the risk of
litigation.45
42

See id. (reporting a decrease in employee absenteeism under the four-day work week).
Several scholars have made compelling arguments that the challenges faced by working female
caregivers will not be resolved by efforts that target women as a distinct class. See, e.g., Martin H.
Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1095 (1994) (arguing for greater attention to
the needs and obligations of fathers because “[g]ender-neutral parental leave policies will not prevent
such discrimination as long as women dominate the use of family leave”); Schultz, supra note 7, at
1939 (explaining why reform should focus on making the workplace conducive to the lives of all
workers so that “[e]veryone would have a right to train for and pursue work of their own choosing,
and . . . [e]veryone would work saner, and more similar hours, so that all of us would have an
opportunity to participate fully in family, friendship, politics, and civic life”); Michael Selmi, The
Limited Vision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 44 VILL. L. REV. 395, 410–11 (1999) (arguing
that men should be given incentives, if not forced, to take parental leave).
44
See Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV.
305, 324–26 (2008) (citing studies demonstrating that employers will choose to accommodate nondisabled workers when practical to do so); Helen A. Schartz et al., Workplace Accommodations:
Empirical Study of Current Employees, 75 MISS. L.J. 917, 941–42 (2006) (finding in a nationwide
study of employers who contacted the Job Accommodation Network that forty-three percent of
accommodated employees did not suffer a substantial limitation of a major life activity); cf. Travis,
Lashing Back, supra note 9, at 363 (arguing that managerial infrastructure created to comply with the
ADA benefits non-disabled workers who are able to reap non-costly accommodations).
45
See Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process, supra note 15, at 63–66 (explaining
these incentives); Travis, Lashing Back, supra note 9, at 363 (“[E]ven if an employer is fairly certain
that it could prevail in a potential lawsuit by proving that an employee’s condition is not a statutory
disability, the employer may find it cost-effective to avoid the risk of defending costly (albeit winning)
43
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But that does not explain what happens in the caregiver context where
there is no background mandate at all. Despite the absence of legal
compulsion, numerous employers accommodate caregiving both through
formal policies, such as paid parental time, and informal accommodation,
such as allowing employees to return to work gradually following
childbirth or adoption.46 In addition, recent data suggests that a large
number of employers offer some degree of flexibility including allowing
employees to alter start and stop times and work occasionally from home.47
The emergence of 4/40 explains in part why employers offer such
accommodations voluntarily—employers see synergies between the life
needs of workers and the needs of their business. Thus, the employer may
regard the choice to accommodate as a good personnel policy, hoping its
decision will yield enhanced productivity, better workplace morale, or
reduced turnover.48 Or, as 4/40 suggests, the employer might see gains to
be harnessed in the form of lower energy consumption or other reductions
in operating costs.49 Either way, it is mutually beneficial for the parties to
make these changes.
III. THE LAW & ECONOMICS OF INDIVIDUAL ACCOMMODATION
What does this mean for the law? Thus far, I have argued both that the
law’s ability to mandate employer-funded benefits to caregivers is finite,
litigation by instead granting the employee’s accommodation request.”); Patrick F. Dorrian, Companies
Should Be ‘Liberal’ with Leave Requests, 21 CORP. COUNS. WKLY. NEWSL. (BNA), Apr. 12, 2006, at
115 (recommending that employers err on the side of accommodating whenever an employee makes a
request as it is difficult to predict who the court will determine to be “disabled”).
46
See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, WORK-LIFE BALANCE
AND THE ECONOMICS OF WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY 10–12 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/files/documents/100331-cea-economics-workplace-flexibility.pdf
[hereinafter
WORK-LIFE
BALANCE] (noting that 56% of large employers surveyed reported giving paid maternity leave; 47%
reported allowing most employees to take a few days off to care for ill children without loss of pay, and
77% allowed some workers to gradually increase hours after chidbirth or adoption).
47
Id. at 4–5, 9 (summarizing surveys in which seventy-nine percent of large employers reported
allowing some workers to periodically change their start and stop time, twenty-eight percent reported
allowing some workers to work compressed work weeks, and more than fifty percent reported allowing
some employees to occasionally work paid hours at home). It is important to note, however, that such
data is derived from employer self-reports and that the percentages refer to the number of employers
who offer these benefits to some workers. See id. at 6 (“If many employers only provide a benefit to a
minority of their workers, the percent of workers with a benefit will be smaller than the percent of firms
offering the same benefit. In addition, there may be a difference between an organization’s policies
and their implementation.”).
48
See Williams, The Family-Hostile Corporation, supra note 9, at 924–25 (describing how
accounting firms Deloitte & Touche and Ernst & Young saved $20 million and at least $25 million,
respectively, upon implementing flexible schedules due to reduced attrition); Jyoti Thottam, Reworking
Work, TIME, July 25, 2005, at 50 (discussing how workers are happier and more productive under Best
Buy’s “results-oriented work environment” program where “employees can work when and where they
like, as long as they get the job done”).
49
See WORKING 4 UTAH INTERIM DRAFT, supra note 41, at 4 (citing annual operational cost
savings of $203,177 in custodial service contracts and energy usage reductions of ten to twenty percent
in half of the buildings since switching to the four-day work week).
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and that employers will, in at least some instances, find reasons to provide
such benefits on their own. One might conclude from this that any further
legislation on behalf of caregivers is unnecessary or impractical. But that
would be wrong for two reasons. First, there is every reason to suppose
that continued advocacy can result in modest legislative reform that
expands, in limited ways, the parameters of existing mandated benefits and
anti-discrimination laws. Second, the fact that employers in some
instances chose to voluntarily accommodate does not mean that they are
doing so optimally.
The first point requires little explanation. As previously discussed, the
past five years have witnessed several limited but important legal
expansions of caregiver law at the federal and state levels, including such
developments as the passage of the FMLA’s Military Leave Amendments,
the adoption by the EEOC of guidance on family responsibilities
discrimination, and the enactment of parental involvement laws by many
states.
The second is the subject of this section. Rational choice theory would
suggest that employers, left to their own devices, will provide individual
non-compelled accommodations whenever it is in their financial interest to
do so. If so, the only role for law is to force employers to provide more
costly accommodations that they would not otherwise choose to undertake.
This view, however, betrays an overly simplistic understanding of
employer incentives and the effects of law on party behavior. The section
that follows draws on behavioral economics to argue that, absent some
intervention, employers are unlikely to act optimally in identifying and
implementing cost-effective accommodations that would assist caregivers.
In so doing, this section lays the groundwork for corrective legislation that
will be the subject of Part IV.
A. Individual Accommodation as Rational Choice
Traditional law and economics scholars would explain employers’
decisions to voluntarily accommodate in terms of rational choice theory.
Employers acting on the basis of full information will make those
accommodations, and only those accommodations, that are utilitymaximizing as determined by a straight cost-benefit analysis.50 Suppose a
new mother returning to work requests permission to leave one hour early
50
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (7th ed. 2007) (“[E]conomics is the
science of rational choice in a world . . . in which resources are limited . . . . [Its task] is to explore the
implications of assuing that man is a rational maximizer of his . . . ‘self-interest’.”); Russell Korobkin,
A “Traditional” and “Behavioral” Law-and-Economics Analysis of Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Company, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 441, 447 (2004) (“[T]he term ‘rational choice theory’ lacks a
single, standard definition . . . . [M]ost versions of [rational choice theory] assume, at a minimum, that
individuals will use all available information to select behaviors that maximize their expected utility.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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each day to pick up her child from daycare. In deciding whether to
approve this arrangement, the employer will weigh the cost to the business
of the five hours per week against the benefit of saving five hours of
wages. If the benefit outweighs the cost (perhaps the worker’s output is
only negligibly reduced and the employer saves five hours’ wages), the
employer will grant the arrangement, as it is inefficient to continue under
the current schedule.51 If, on the other hand, the employer will suffer
losses in excess of the wage savings (perhaps the employer will have to
assign an employee with a higher hourly rate to cover the lost hours), the
employer will deny the request.52
What counts as costs and benefits in any particular situation will range
from straightforward monetary gains and losses, as in the example above,
to broader, more intangible considerations such as the value of the
particular worker and the culture of the particular workplace. For instance,
on the cost side, an employer might weigh the possibility that the repeated
early departure of one worker will negatively affect office morale. If such
a risk is likely, it may well be rational for the employer to deny the
caregiver’s accommodation request even if the savings in wages and loss
of five hours of performance cancel one another out or would otherwise
suggest a gain to the company. Similarly, on the benefit side, the employer
might weigh the possibility that granting the accommodation will instill
greater loyalty in the worker, which may increase her productivity and
reduce the likelihood of absenteeism and turnover.53 This might push an
employer to grant an accommodation that, dollar for dollar, would
otherwise appear inefficient.
Of course, it is not always easy for decision makers to identify or
assign values to these variables, creating informational deficits that may
impede rational choice.54 The point, however, is that assuming employers
can and do undertake such a calculus, the role of regulatory law is limited
to mandating behavior that rational employers would not otherwise
undertake. Figure 2 illustrates this relationship.

51
Of course, this raises the question why the employer pays the worker for full-time work under
the current schedule in the first place. A utility-maximizing employer would have sought the reduction
in working hours (or else cut the worker’s pay). The short answer to this is that a combination of
information deficits and cognitive biases prevent the employer from realizing the possibility of a utility
gain. I will turn to the operation of these impediments to rational behavior infra Part III.B.1–2.
52
A third possibility is that the change is cost-neutral to the employer. In such a situation the
proposed accommodation is the Pareto superior schedule, as it will make the employee better off
without changing the employer’s bottom line. For this reason, I place cost-neutral accommodations
within the category of cost-effective accommodations that the employer ought to be willing to grant
voluntarily. Employers, however, may lack the incentive to implement these accommodations, a
subject addressed infra Part III.B.
53
See WORK-LIFE BALANCE, supra note 46, at 17–22 (summarizing data on the economic
benefits of flexible scheduling).
54
See infra Part III.B.
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Figure 2

The left side of the chart represents cost-effective and cost-neutral
accommodations; the right side represents those that pose a net cost to
employers. The shaded area, section A, represents the universe of
accommodations
that
employers
grant
voluntarily.
Granted
accommodations are co-extensive with and limited to cost-effective ones,
except where the law specifically requires employers to absorb the cost of
additional accommodations, represented here by the darker shaded area,
section B, or where employers over-comply with governing mandates,
represented here as section C.55 Employers will rationally withhold all
other non-cost effective accommodations, represented here by section D.
Laws mandating additional non-cost-effective accommodations from
within section D might be justified by redistributive goals focusing on the
relative means of employers and non-traditional workers or by normative
goals, such as the desire to achieve results-based equality for all workers,
but they are not market-corrective.56 In sum, absent legal mandates, there
55
Such over-compliance is not irrational given the cost of litigation, particularly in the context of
an open-ended mandate (such as exists under the ADA) where the scope of the law is uncertain. See
supra text accompanying notes 36–38.
56
This is at least the case when examing market failures as between the employer and the
individual caregiver. In the ADA context, some have made the claim that the reasonable
accommodation mandate advances aggregate utility by facilitating employment of individuals who
would otherwise rely on the social welfare system. See Samuel Bagenstos, The Americans with
Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 957–75 (2003) (tracing themes of
“welfare reform” and the “cost saving” function of the ADA in the political movement culminating in
the statute’s adoption); Amy L. Wax, Disability, Reciprocity, and “Real Efficiency”: A Unified
Approach, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1421, 1425 (2003) (“[T]he ADA can be seen as a way for
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is a set of accommodations that employers will justifiably refuse to
implement, but also a large swath of accommodations that they will
voluntarily undertake and to which legal regulation is seemingly irrelevant.
B. Individual Accommodation and the Limits on Rational Choice Theory
But as economists themselves acknowledge, human beings do not
always behave as rational choice theory would predict. For a variety of
reasons—lack of information, cognitive biases, transactions costs and other
impediments—individuals may make sub-optimal decisions. In the
context of workplace accommodations, this may mean that employers are
under-serving caregivers (and in some instances themselves) by failing to
make cost-neutral and even mutually advantageous accommodations.
The recent trend toward 4/40 offers insight to the problem. A four-day
work week is nothing new; compressed schedules were instituted by
hundreds of companies during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and isolated
instances of its use date to the 1940s.57 If 4/40 is in fact the cost-effective,
energy saving, and family-friendly policy that some employers currently
claim, why are they only now considering its adoption?58 One possibility
is that the 4/40 structure is cost-effective only when energy costs are
exceptionally high, as they were in 2008 when programs such as the Utah
initiative were unfurled. Another possibility, however, is that employers,
until now, failed to identify the potential value of work restructuring due to
defects and limitations in their decisionmaking process. Such defects may
include informational deficits, such as a lack of knowledge or experience
with alternative schedules, combined with high barriers to obtaining that
information. Or they may be the result of strong predispositions in favor of
the status quo, skepticism about change, or other biases that employers
were forced to re-examine in light of recent financial circumstances.
Whatever the explanation, impediments to rational decision making are
likely to redouble in individual accommodation situations where requests
are made ad hoc to individual supervisors with idiosyncratic biases and a
lack of incentive to assess long-term employer interests. This section
explores some of these impediments to the optimal implementation of
taxpayers to unload some of the costs of supporting the disabled population onto employers.”). It is
possible that accommodation of caregivers offers comparable social benefits that, on balance, outweigh
the costs to employers. See WORK-LIFE BALANCE, supra note 46, at 19–24 (suggesting that flexible
work benefits society by encouraging labor force participation, improving worker health, and reducing
commute time). Whether such claims can be sustained is a question beyond the scope of this Article.
57
See Robert C. Bird, The Four-Day Work Week: Old Lessons, New Questions, 42 CONN. L. REV.
___ (2010).
58
It should be noted that existing research on the positive effects of 4/40 is conflicting. See id. at
___. For purposes of this analysis, however, I assume that the sanguine claims of employers currently
experimenting with 4/40 are true. If not, however, that would merely strengthen the point that
employers (and, a fortiori, individual managers) are often not able to assess ex ante the costs and
benefits of any particular change in schedule.
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individual caregiver accommodation, beginning with the problem of
information deficits and then turning to the problem of cognitive bias in
decision making.
1. Information Deficits59
At the most basic level, employers’ ability to identify and effectuate
cost-effective accommodations is dependent on individual requests. Not
every caregiver who would benefit from an accommodation asks for one,
and it is often rational for caregivers to keep silent about their personal
needs.60 A caregiver may worry that requesting an accommodation will
signal to the employer that she is not committed to her job61 or that the
request will trigger subsequent discrimination or retaliation.62 Such fears
are well grounded. Empirical research demonstrates that working mothers
are often perceived as lacking in competence, undependable, and
uncommitted to their work,63 and case law supplies powerful anecdotal
examples of how such stereotypes may translate into actual
discrimination.64 On the other hand, female caregivers may be reluctant to
59
I consciously use the term “information deficits” rather than “information asymmetry,” the term
usually adopted in law and economics literature, as information asymmetry typically refers to situations
in which one party has information that the other does not. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham & Zhiyong Liu,
Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 523, 549 (2006)
(explaining that after parties to a contract “learn their own valuations, they are asymmetrically
informed” because each contains information that the other party does not have). Such asymmetries
are certainly present in the individual accommodation context (as where an employee knows that a
particular schedule change would be helpful for her but does not share that information with her
employer). I wish to consider, however, informational impediments to optimal behavior as
encompassing actual gaps in information suffered by both parties and which may not be feasible to
correct (as where both the employer and employee are ignorant as to the likely effect a particular
accommodation will have on office morale or productivity).
60
Cf. J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 903, 911 (2003) (noting that in the
disability context, job applicants may choose to keep unobservable disabilities secret, resulting in
inefficient job matching).
61
The problem of signaling concerns impeding workers’ ability to bargain for their preferred
terms of employment has been explored in the context of just-cause protection. See Walter Kamiat,
Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the Possible Failures of
Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1958–59 (1996) (suggesting that workers will not
request just-cause protection for fear that they will be perceived as poor performers).
62
Such a result could be actionable as a matter of gender discrimination law or under an
applicable state law outlawing family responsibilities discrimination. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.80.220 (2008) (making “parenthood” a protected characteristic under an unlawful employment
practices statute); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2010) (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the
basis of “family responsibilities”); EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 13 (discussing unlawful
disparate treatment of female caregivers). There is, however, currently no anti-retaliation protection for
merely requesting an accommodation outside of the disability context.
63
See Williams & Segal, supra note 9, at 90–91 (discussing social science stereotype studies
whereby “career women” rated high in competence and “housewives” rated low in competence, and
inferring that “[o]nce a woman’s status as a mother becomes salient . . . she may begin to be perceived
as a low-competence caregiver rather than a high-competence business woman”).
64
See, e.g., Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 332 F.3d 1150, 1160 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that the
plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of her pregnancy); see also Williams & Segal, supra
note 9, at 122–61 (providing case examples).
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push hard for particular benefits or concessions for fear of being viewed as
aggressive or troublesome. Studies of other terms of employment, such as
salary, show that women who negotiate with their employers often are
viewed as demanding or entitled, while men who make similar requests are
viewed as confident and professional.65
At the same time, managers lack any incentive to inquire into a
worker’s caregiving responsibilities.
Such questions are correctly
perceived to be outside the scope of a manager’s job responsibilities. In
addition to the risk that such questions will appear personally intrusive, the
manager may fear being charged with discrimination.66 While employers’
liability concerns might be exaggerated, it is certainly good risk
management practice for human resource personnel and defense attorneys
to counsel companies not to inquire into workers’ immutable
characteristics and family status.67
Even if an employee comes forward with a request, his or her
supervisor is unlikely to have information about the feasibility of an
accommodation and probably has limited means of—or interest in—
making such a determination. The Utah 4/40 plan is instructive in this
regard. The move to a 4/40 work week was a top-down undertaking
spearheaded by Utah’s governor and preceded by significant study and
budget forecasting.68 The State rolled out the plan on a trial basis and
completed a detailed evaluation before implementing it permanently.69 In
this way, Utah’s 4/40 plan resembled other highly publicized workplace
restructuring initiatives aimed at such goals as securing greater racial
diversity, eliminating the glass ceiling, or achieving improved morale and
retention, which involved careful coordination, oversight, and study.70
While such initiatives have been applauded as paradigmatic
65
See Joan C. Williams, Reconstructive Feminism: Changing the Way We Talk About Gender and
Work Thirty Years After the PDA, 21 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 79, 107–08 (2009) (summarizing studies).
66
Employer inquiries about family responsibilities may be used as evidence of discrimination.
See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 13 (“Relevant evidence in charges alleging disparate
treatment of female caregivers may include . . . [w]hether the respondent asked female applicants . . .
whether they were married or had young children, or about their childcare . . . responsibilities . . . .”).
Such inquiries are actionable in and of themselves under some state laws. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 46a-60(a)(9) (2009) (“It shall be a discriminatory practice . . . to request or require information from
an employee . . . relating to the individual’s child-bearing age or plans . . . or the individual’s familial
responsibilities . . . .”).
67
See, e.g, Williams & Segal, supra note 9, at 160 (describing how “statements supervisors make
to mothers become embarrassing in court and can only aid plaintiffs who seek to recover”).
68
See generally WORKING 4 UTAH, INITIATIVE PERFORMANCE REPORT, BASELINE DRAFT (2008),
available at http://www.utah.gov/governor/docs/Working4UtahReport.pdf (forecasting economic
impacts and various other costs, benefits, and impacts of the program launched by Utah Governor Jon
Huntsman).
69
See generally WORKING 4 UTAH INTERIM DRAFT, supra note 41 (following the Baseline Draft
six months into the program’s one-year pilot period and reporting actual impacts of the program as of
that time).
70
See Sturm, supra note 14, at 519–20 (describing systemic overhauls implemented by
companies, including Deloitte & Touche and Intel, to address structural gender disparities).
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worker/management partnerships, they are relatively unique. Few firms
are likely to devote the resources required to investigate, assess, and
implement a workplace restructuring for the uncertain prospect of what
might be negligible savings.71
The situation faced by the individual supervisor is in some ways less
daunting, but at the same time poses a higher risk. Consider once again the
employee who asks her supervisor to leave one hour early each day. The
supervisor need not engage in the wide-scale assessment involved in a
firm-wide initiative to determine whether to grant the particular request.
Law and economics scholars, however, recognize that individuals are
“boundedly rational” in the degree to which they access and process
relevant information.72 In this case, the supervisor is unlikely to have the
time or means to calculate or predict things such as the likely effect of the
employee’s departure on work output, its implications for office morale,
and its ability to generate future returns for the company in terms of
employee loyalty and retention, all of which would be relevant to a true
cost-benefit assessment.73 Most front-line supervisors are neither capable
of, nor charged with, responsibility for this type of analysis.74
Moreover, any attempt to ascertain the implications of adopting the
accommodation, as through a trial effort, comes at significant risk to the
individual supervisor. If the attempted accommodation adversely affects
production or has other negative consequences, higher-ups will hold the
71
See Arnow-Richman, Accommodation Subverted, supra note 3, at 379 (describing such efforts
as the exception rather than the rule); Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 33, at 702–03 (explaining that,
while private firm incentives can lead to some organizational reform, the high costs of big structural
changes may appear unjustified); WORK-LIFE BALANCE, supra note 46, at 23 (noting that firms are
often slow to adopt new management practices, despite their documented efficiencies, in explaining the
absence of more widespread adoption of flexible work practices). On the other hand, one should not
underestimate the possibility of more spontaneous and higher risk experimentation in work
restructuring, particularly by smaller employers or fledgling companies. Such initiatives have received
attention in the popular media. See Jennifer Ludden, When Employers Make Room for Work-Life
Balance, NPR, Mar. 15, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124611210&
sc=nl&cc=nh-20100315 (describing the decision of a female executive of a 100-plus person software
development company to allow employees to “largely set their own hours and telecommute at will” in
recognition of employees’ need for work/life balance).
72
Bounded rationality refers to the idea that human decision making is usually based on limited
information and information processing. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the
Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 214 (1995); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality,
Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1207 (2003).
73
See Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 214 (“[S]earching for and processing information does involve
costs, in the form of time, energy, and perhaps money. Most actors either don’t want to expend the
resources required for comprehensive search and processing or recognize that comprehensive search
and processing would not be achievable at any realistic cost.”).
74
See id.
[O]ur abilities to process information and solve problems are constrained by
limitations of computational ability, ability to calculate consequences, ability to
organize and utilize memory . . . . [A]ctors will often process imperfectly even the
information they do acquire. Such imperfections in human processing ability
increase as decisions become more complex and involve more permutations.
Id.
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supervisor accountable. Rather than making a reasoned calculation about
possible outcomes, therefore, a supervisor will more likely act on instinct,
granting or denying the request based on the limited information that he or
she already has. Such an approach is fraught with potential for bias—a
subject explored in the next section.
In sum, it is unlikely that front-line supervisors will make careful
assessments of the costs and benefits of particular accommodation
requests. As a result, some accommodations that would help working
caregivers—while posing no cost to the employer or even, in some cases,
resulting in cost savings—likely are not being implemented.
2. Cognitive Bias
If supervisors are unlikely to think comprehensively about the costs
and benefits of particular accommodation requests, how do they make
decisions about whether to accommodate? Law and economics scholars
have recognized that in making choices or predictions, individuals are
likely to rely on flawed heuristics.76 Decision makers may unduly rely on
recent information, generalize based on particular salient experiences,
over- or under-estimate future risk, overvalue the status quo, and take other
cognitive shortcuts in processing information and reaching a result.
Consistent with this description, social scientists researching social
cognition and the operation of discriminatory bias have demonstrated that
mental heuristics may reflect latent biases or assumptions about nontraditional group members.77 Professor Joan Williams and other legal
scholars have developed and applied this theory in the context of
employers’ treatment of working caregivers.78 In making decisions,
75
To some extent, this reflects an agency problem. In cases where employers stand to reap only
long-term gains by accommodating workers, the interests of a particular manager and the company as a
whole may deviate. The company has a strong interest in long-term productivity and turnover
reduction, whereas the manager may be focused on the immediate task of satisfying his discrete job
requirements and constrained by the transaction costs entailed in evaluating and effectuating individual
accommodations. See George M. Cohen, When Law and Economics Met Professional Responsibility,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 279 (1998).
In all principal-agent relationships, there is a divergence of interests because of the
separation of ownership (in the principal) and control (in the agent) of productive
assets. Because the agent does not reap the full reward from his efforts on the
principal’s behalf, and because the agent knows more than the principal about what
the agent is doing (what economists refer to as “asymmetric information”), the agent
has the incentive and opportunity to act—whether alone or in concert with others—
in numerous ways that harm the principal’s interests.
Id.
76
See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 218–25 (summarizing research exploring the effects of
“defective capability” on decisionmaking processes).
77
See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995) (describing
how cognitive structures and processes involved in categorization and information processing often
result in stereotyping).
78
See Joan C. Williams, Litigating the Glass Ceiling and the Maternal Wall: Using Stereotyping
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employers may unconsciously mistreat mothers and pregnant women
because of stereotypes about their competency and fitness for market
work.79 Thus, absences or tardiness by a working mother may be more
salient to an employer than the attendance record of a child-free worker, or
the employer may be more inclined to look for—and consequently prone to
find—deficiencies in the mother’s performance.80 As a result, the
employer may evaluate working caregivers more harshly than traditional
workers, provide them lower-profile work, and fail to consider them for
promotions and key assignments for which they are otherwise qualified.
These same heuristics may influence the way in which a supervisor
weighs a request for an individual accommodation. Returning to the prior
example about the new mother who asks to leave one hour early each day,
imagine that the mother proposes that she make up the one hour per day
working one hour each evening from home after her children go to sleep.
Suppose that the work in question is of the type that is transportable to a
home environment—for instance, it involves preparing documents that can
be done on a home computer—so that there ought to be a very limited
effect, if any, on the employee’s marginal product. If the supervisor
believes, however, consciously or unconsciously, that mothers are not as
committed to their jobs as other workers he may over-predict possible
adverse consequences of granting the request, or make unfounded
assumptions about how it will impact the worker’s performance. Thus, the
supervisor might assume that the mother will not actually perform the daily
hour of work at home, that her performance will be affected by the
distraction of her children, that granting the request will encourage further
requests or shirking, or that there is no point in allowing the
accommodation because the mother will eventually quit her job anyway.
Of course, if such beliefs did influence the supervisor, his decision
would in theory be actionable under basic anti-discrimination principles.
Those laws do not require accommodation of a caregiver’s desire to work
at home, but they do preclude consideration of gender in determining terms
and conditions of employment.81 The new mother in this hypothetical
and Cognitive Bias Evidence To Prove Gender Discrimination, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 287, 300–
01 (2003) [hereinafter Williams, Glass Ceiling] (summarizing scholarship).
79
See Susan Huhta et al., Looking Forward and Back: Using the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
and Discriminatory Gender/Pregnancy Stereotyping To Challenge Discrimination Against New
Mothers, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 303, 318–20 (2003) (summarizing studies demonstrating that
working mothers received competence ratings equivalent to those of elderly, retarded, and disabled
workers, and that pregnant women received lower performance ratings than non-pregnant women
engaging in identical behavior).
80
See Krieger, The Content of Our Categories, supra note 77, at 1206 (explaining that where
males and females perform a stereotypically male task poorly, the female may be more severely
punished because the supervisor sees her performance as “dispositional” and sees the male’s
performance as “situational”); Williams, Glass Ceiling, supra note 78, at 294 (describing “the tendency
of in-groups to apply objective rules rigorously to outsiders but flexibly to insiders”).
81
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2) (2006); EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 13 (“[S]tereotypes
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could bring a “discriminatory failure to accommodate” claim.
In this
scenario, the reason (or a reason) for the denial of the requested
accommodation was based on gender stereotype. The difficulty, however,
is that such adverse actions often masquerade as legitimate business
decisions, particularly where the influence of bias is subtle or unconscious.
One is only likely to be able to prove the effect of cognitive bias where
statements or stray remarks reflect the decision makers’ stereotypical
beliefs or where the existence of more favorably-treated comparators
creates an inference that stereotype influenced the decision.83 Thus, it is
likely that supervisors, in at least a subset of cases, are making decisions
about individual accommodations that are not only sub-optimal, but also
discriminatory, and which are currently going undetected (and
unremedied) by existing law.
Just as employers may rely on heuristics built in part on stereotypes
about working caregivers, they may also rely on heuristics based in an
essentialistic understanding of the proper structure of work. In the early
departure hypothetical, the supervisor not only makes judgments about the
worker herself—whether she is “deserving” of the accommodation,
whether she will in fact work at home, and whether it is in the company’s
interest to invest in her retention—he also makes judgments about the
viability of the accommodation in light of the company’s business needs.
He may wonder whether the departure will disrupt other workers or
working relationships, whether it will negatively affect office morale,
whether it will limit his ability to monitor and supervise work, or whether
it will adversely affect the quality of the goods or services the company
provides.
In the context of any particular accommodation decision, such
concerns may be legitimate or they may be overstated. In the current
example, the requested time away from the office is limited to one hour per
day, so problems owing to lost “face time” at work ought to be de minimis.
Yet, there are many reasons why the supervisor might exaggerate these
that female caregivers should not, will not, or cannot be committed to their jobs are sex-based,
employment decisions [that] violate Title VII.”).
82
Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process, supra note 15, at 34.
83
Cases involving explicit stereotype-based statements about pregnant and working mothers are
not infrequent. See Huhta et al., supra note 79, at 320–21. On the other hand, caregivers’ ability to
win discrimination cases using comparator evidence is often hampered by court decisions requiring the
situation of the proffered comparators to be almost indistinguishable from the plaintiff herself. See,
e.g., Walker v. Fred Nesbit Distrib. Co., 356 F. Supp. 2d 964, 968 (S.D. Iowa 2005) (upholding a jury
verdict for an employer charged with discriminatory failure to accommodate a pregnant truck driver
seeking light duty despite the fact that the employer had a policy of accommodating male drivers
injured on the job and had previously accommodated some male drivers injured off the job, implicitly
accepting the employer’s contention that the pregnant driver was not similarly situated to male workers
unable to lift due to work injuries); see also Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving
Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 238–39 (2009) (critiquing the strict view of
relevant comparators and urging an objective evaluation of comparability guided by expert testimony).
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risks. Professor Michelle Travis has demonstrated that in assessing failure
to accommodate claims under the ADA, courts betray a very narrow view
of the appropriate structure of work, treating the FTFT norm as an essential
and inevitable component of the job.84 Thus, courts routinely hold that
requests to work from home, alter attendance requirements, or change
work schedules are unreasonable and have consistently denied claims
based on an employer’s failure to provide these types of
accommodations.85
The same tendency may occur when supervisors vet individual
accommodation requests not only from disabled workers but from
caregivers as well. Thus, a supervisor presented with a request to work
reduced hours, work on a flexible schedule, or work from home may
perceive these accommodations as inherently inconsistent with work norms
even in situations where, from an objective perspective, they are unlikely
to pose any cost to the employer. Such a view may in part be explained by
the empirically documented effect of status quo allocations. Studies
demonstrate that in a variety of contexts, from exchanges of goods to
changes in the state of the world, individuals systematically favor
maintaining their current situation over an equally valuable alternative.86
In effect, individuals exact a premium in negotiating for change and will
ask more for giving up what they currently enjoy than they would pay to
acquire it in the first place. 87
In the individual accommodation context this would mean that a
supervisor will place undue value on maintaining existing work rules and
structures. The supervisor may prefer having each worker perform all
eight hours of work at the work site to working one hour from home even
if all other aspects of the alternative arrangement are objectively equal. If
84

See Travis, Recapturing, supra note 3, at 23.
See Arnow-Richman, Accommodation Subverted, supra note 3, at 365–66 (providing case
examples); Travis, Recapturing, supra note 3, at 25–28 (same). An interesting question is whether this
tendancy is likely to change as flexible work practices grow more prevalent. There is some case
support to suggest that employees can be successful in seeking accommodations that violate the FTFT
norm where such deviations were previously tolerated by the employer. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Marietta
Mem’l Hosp., 2010 WL 749897 *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2010) (denying summary judgment to an
employer on a bipolar worker’s claim of unreasonable failure to accommodate request to work
occasionally from home on a flexible schedule where plaintiff had successfully maintained that work
arrangement for eight years prior to its discontinuation by a new supervisor); Graffius v. Shinseki, 672
F. Supp. 2d 119, 128 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding a material issue of fact as to whether allowing the plaintiff
to telecommute would pose an undue hardship in light of her job description and the fact that she had
previously received a high performance evaluation while telecommuting).
86
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608,
625 (1998).
87
See id. at 627. If individuals valued particular states of the world without reference to preexisting allocations, they would value the cost to achieve or acquire that state of the world the same as
they would to give that state up. Controlled experiments, however, consistently reveal a gap between
the price individuals are willing to pay to acquire an object or achieve a particular state of the world
and the price they are willing to accept to sell that same object or relinquish that state of the world. Id.
85
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so, cost effective accommodations that parties should ordinarily implement
as a matter of rational choice may, in some situations, be denied.
C. Voluntary Accommodation Revisited
The previous section argued that, in contrast to the conclusions of
rational choice theory, cost effective accommodations will not necessarily
be granted by employers voluntarily. Supervisors’ decisions may be based
on limited or inaccurate information, subtly influenced by bias toward
working caregivers, or reflect an intractable desire to preserve the status
quo.
For these reasons, the universe of individual accommodations that are
currently granted to caregivers likely looks less like Figure 2 and more like
the following:
Figure 3

Figure 3 demonstrates the actual state of voluntary accommodation. In
contrast to Figure 2, only a portion of the cost-effective accommodations
on the left side of the graph are in fact voluntarily implemented. Thus,
shaded section A, representing voluntarily provided accommodations, is
significantly smaller than the full universe of cost-effective
accommodations. The rest of that half of the graph (sections A1 and A2)
represents those situations in which a cost-effective accommodation is not
achieved due to information deficits, cognitive bias, or any number of
other possible limitations on rational choice. The denial of some number
of these cost-effective accommodations likely owes to bias against
caregivers as a class, and may therefore constitute actionable gender
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discrimination (represented here as section A2). Importantly, though, even
assuming that all denials based on group bias were adequately redressed by
existing discrimination law, there remains a universe of cost-effective
accommodations that parties fail to achieve due to market breakdown and
which ought to be addressed through legal intervention.
IV. THE ROLE OF LAW IN INCENTING VOLUNTARY ACCOMMODATION
This section returns to the question of law and the role it might play in
light of both the potential for and the limitations of voluntary
accommodation. As described in Part II, there are various challenges
inherent in crafting legislation that mandates caregiver accommodation. If
the goal of legal intervention, however, is not to impose particular
obligations on employers, but to facilitate the discovery of mutually
beneficial accommodations, then other options present.
Pending
legislation creating a statutory “right to request” flexible work offers an
example. The Working Families Flexibility Act (the “WFFA” or the
“Act”), modeled on the 2002 Right to Request Law adopted in the United
Kingdom,88 creates and protects a worker’s procedural right to apply for a
change in schedule.89 The law imposes no obligation on the employer to
accept the worker’s proposal and therefore is unlikely to affect widespread
work restructuring or individual accommodations that impose significant
costs on employers. If adopted, however, the law may lead workers and
employers to identify and implement cost-effective accommodations that
they might otherwise have ignored or overlooked. This section considers
the benefits and limitations of such a law with an eye toward correcting the
impediments to optimal voluntary accommodation presented in Part III.
A. The Working Families Flexibility Act
Introduced in the House of Representatives in March 2009, the WFFA
sets forth a new procedural right under which full and part-time workers
may “apply” to their employer for a change in employment terms.90
Specifically, the law sanctions employee requests pertaining to the hours,
times and location where the employee is required to work.91 In effect, the
law targets those aspects of work structure that comprise the FTFT norm,
and which are often the most onerous to working caregivers.
While the Act places no substantive obligations on the employer, it
does several things to enhance the process by which individual
accommodation requests are posed and vetted. While nominally designed
88
Employment Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/
pdf/ukpga_20020022_en.pdf.
89
Working Families Flexibility Act, H.R. 1274, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2009).
90
Id.
91
Id.
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to assist working families, the right to request applies to all workers who
meet basic eligibility requirements, not just caregivers.92 The fact that the
ability to request is declared a right available to everyone may encourage
workers to come forward93 and may in particular reduce the stigma
associated with the special needs of caregivers.94 In addition, the Act
protects those who propose changes in employment terms from subsequent
retaliation by their employer.95 Workers subjected to adverse action based
on their invocation of rights under the Act may recover equitable relief
including backpay.96 As a strategic matter, this provision should reduce
the need for a plaintiff caregiver to identify a gender-based motivation for
a subsequent adverse action in order to challenge that conduct under
traditional anti-discrimination law. Whereas a plaintiff proceeding under
the latter statute would have to demonstrate that the employer’s response to
her accommodation request was influenced by gender stereotype, the Act
creates a direct cause of action for adverse treatment based on the
plaintiff’s need for an altered schedule.97 In this way, the Act reduces the
risks inherent in coming forward with individual requests.
92
See id. § 2(1) (defining “employee” as an individual “who has worked an average of at least 20
hours per week or . . . at least 1,000 hours per year”). In this respect, the Act differs substantially from
its European precursors such as the U.K.’s Right to Request Law, which originally applied to parents of
children under the age of six and now applies to those with children under the age of seventeen, as well
as those who care for a disabled child or adult.
93
On the value of rights and identity, see DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF
INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 78–80, 104–
05 (2003); Catherine Albiston, Bargaining in the Shadow of Social Institutions: Competing Discourses
and Social Change in Workplace Mobilization of Civil Rights, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 11, 27–28
(2005).
94
Per this theory, some scholars have argued that working women will not achieve equal
employment quality until men seek workplace accommodations for caregiving. See, e.g., Martin H.
Malin, Fathers and Paternal Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1095 (1994) (suggesting that improving
parental leave policies will benefit women because “[t]he lack of good paternal leave policies also
encourages workplace discrimination against women of childbearing age”); Michael Selmi, Family
Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 708 (2000) (“[I]f there is to be greater equality
for women in the workplace, it will be necessary for men to change their behavior, both in and out of
the workplace, before employers will begin to change theirs.”). Of course, this problem will not go
away if, despite the WFFA’s broad applicability, it is invoked primarily by women. Such has been the
experience with the FMLA, which is also gender-neutral. See Deborah J. Anthony, The Hidden Harms
of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Gender-Neutral Versus Gender-Equal, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 459, 479–80 (2008) (summarizing Department of Labor statistics on FMLA usage,
which demonstrate that men use FMLA leave less often than do women and that they do so primarily
for their own health needs rather than to care for others); Chuck Halverson, From Here to Paternity:
Why Men Are Not Taking Paternity Leave Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 257, 260–61 (2003) (same). Unlike the FMLA, however, the WFFA is not only genderneutral—it applies to caregivers and non-caregivers alike.
95
Working Families Flexibility Act, H.R. 1274, 111th Cong. § 5(b) (2009).
96
Id. § 7(a)(2).
97
Instead, the plaintiff will presumably have to prove that the request triggered the adverse action.
While this is likely to be a difficult task in itself, the plaintiff is no longer saddled with the problem of
unearthing comparators whose treatment varied by gender. See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20
F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that the plaintiff could prevail on a discrimination claim
based on the employer’s unwillingness to tolerate her pregnancy-related tardiness and leave
requirements only if the employer would have fired “a hypothetical Mr. Troupe, who is as tardy as Ms.
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The Act also imposes a number of procedural requirements on an
employer who receives a statutory request. The employer must hold a
meeting with the worker within fourteen days of the request.98 It must
subsequently provide a written decision on the request that explains the
reason for any denial, which may include such things as the resources of
the employer, the costs posed by the change in terms, potential effects of
the change on customers, and other managerial concerns.99 The employer
must also follow a similar procedure in the event the employee requests
reconsideration of her proposal following a denial.100 Any refusal to
follow these procedures may result in a civil penalty of up to $5000.101
These provisions lay out what is essentially a methodology for
evaluating individual accommodation requests. In this way, the “right to
request” may be helpful in overcoming some of the cognitive and
informational limitations that likely plague unregulated supervisory
decision making. At a minimum, the Act forces a degree of mutual
information disclosure. Workers who wish to be accommodated must
describe their preferences and needs; supervisors charged with evaluating
requests must communicate about their managerial and cost concerns.
Such a process could lead to the shared discovery of viable solutions that
would not otherwise have been identified. It could also encourage more
aggressive efforts by supervisors to acquire information about the business
implications of a particular accommodation. Because the supervisor will
have to meet with the applicant, and ultimately provide a written decision,
he must invest some time and forethought to the stakes of the decision,
including short- and long-term effects of the requested accommodation. In
some cases, this could produce more deliberative results grounded in facts
rather than purely reflexive responses based on limited information and
supposition.
While there is little to suggest that the WFFA’s sponsors had the
particular problem of information deficits in mind, overcoming those types
of obstacles to accommodation is clearly a goal of the British Right to
Request Law on which the WFFA is modeled. That law, which dates to
2002 and grants working parents a comparable right to request flexible
work, is premised on the idea that employers stand to benefit from flexible
schedules but are ill-informed both about the needs of their workers and
the possibilities for change. Guidance interpreting the law suggests that
the goal is to put both parties on the same side of the table where they can
Troupe was, also because of health problems, and who is about to take a protracted sick leave growing
out of those problems at an expense to [the employer] equal to that of Ms. Troupe’s maternity leave”).
98
H.R. 1274 § 4(b)(1)(A).
99
Id. § 4(b)(1)(B)–(C).
100
Id. § 4(b)(1)(E)–(K).
101
Id. § 7(a)(1).
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educate
one
another
and
realize
mutually
advantageous
102
accommodations.
In this respect, both the WFFA and its British counterpart are
reminiscent of the well-established interactive process protocol imposed
under disability law. Regulations interpreting the ADA counsel employers
who receive an accommodation request, or have reason to know of a
worker’s disability, to “initiate an informal, interactive process” with the
worker.103 Courts have held that an interactive process is mandatory and,
in some instances, have divined a prima facie case of unlawful failure to
accommodate from the employer’s refusal to engage in that process.104
Courts so holding recognize that good process is an essential component in
identifying and achieving viable accommodations consistent with the
statute. Indeed, the interactive process requirement has been credited with
enhancing compliance and effecting numerous accommodations outside
the litigation context.105
It is also possible that the WFFA’s procedural requirements will help
alleviate some of the effects of subconscious discriminatory bias. Social
science research has determined that subconscious bias is especially likely
to exert influence in situations calling for the exercise of discretionary
judgment.106 The procedure set forth in the WFFA could ideally replace
102

See U.K. DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUS., FLEXIBLE WORKING: THE RIGHT TO REQUEST AND THE
DUTY TO CONSIDER 2 (2003).
103
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2009).
104
See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1112, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that
“[a]lmost all of the circuits to rule on the question have held that an employer has a mandatory
obligation to engage in the interactive process” and concluding that the employer breached that duty
where it summarily rejected all three of planitff’s proposed accommodations, including a “low-tech”
lifting device that “may well have been an adequate reasonable accommodation,” and offered no
practical alternatives), vacated on other grounds, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002);
Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 633–34 (7th Cir. 1998) (declining to grant an employer
summary judgment because factual dispute remained as to whether the employer caused the breakdown
in the interactive process by failing to place plaintiff in a temporary position and failing to inform him
of a position open to job-bidding); Picinich v. United Parcel Serv., 321 F. Supp. 2d 485, 513–16
(N.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment for the employer on a
failure-to-accommodate claim where plaintiff’s evidence suggested that the employer delayed the
interactive process and withheld information about job openings).
105
See Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process, supra note 15, at 56 (speculating that
the ADA interactive process requirement “is giving disabled workers a leg up in negotiating with their
employers and, as a consequence, is achieving favorable, cooperatively designed solutions under the
radar of reported case law”); Stephen F. Befort, Accommodation at Work: Lessons from the Americans
with Disabilities Act and Possibilities for Alleviating the American Worker Time Crunch, 13 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 615, 626 (2004) (“The interactive process contemplated by the ADA is a unique
procedural device that has launched untold numbers of successful workplace accommodations.”); cf.
Travis, Lashing Back, supra note 9, at 359–63 (describing how, in addition to leading to
accommodation of the disabled, formalized procedures implemented in response to the interactive
process requirement yield residual benefits to non-disabled workers).
106
On this basis, some legal scholars have set forth substantive theories of employer liability for
structural discrimination in situations where managers are left to act on unguided discretion. See, e.g.,
Green, supra note 14, at 145 (proposing a “structural account of disparate treatment theory [that] would
hold employers directly liable under Title VII for organizational choices, institutional practices, and
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unstructured decision making by individual supervisors with a more
focused review of relevant business considerations. The operation of
subconscious bias may also be tempered by the Act’s requirement that the
parties meet, at least one time, to discuss the worker’s application.107
Social science research suggests that contextual factors, such as immediate
exposure to subjects of negative stereotypes, can impact the degree to
which bias manifests in subsequent decisions.108
In one notable
experiment, the presence of an African American test administrator
resulted in a reduction in the degree of automatic prejudice subjects
exhibited during the subsequent diagnostic.109 In the context of a right to
request, the requirement that the employer actually meet with the
individual could serve as the immediate corrective exposure that mitigates
the effects of negative stereotypes about caregivers.
B. Implications for Voluntary Accommodation
Undoubtedly, this is a highly optimistic take on the significance of the
WFFA. Perhaps it is too optimistic. A procedural mandate certainly will
not eliminate all of the innate biases and limitations associated with human
decision making. Supervisors may develop a more expansive view of the
range of possible accommodations, but they are not likely to become better
forecasters of the productivity and retention effects of granting them.110 In
the same vein, stereotyping and other forms of bias are innate components
of human cognition, and certain effects on judgment will likely persist
even in the face of positive exposure and extended dialogue.111
Perhaps more problematic is the risk that the delineated procedures
specified in the Act will operate as a script for compliance that

workplace dynamics that enable the operation of discriminatory bias”); Melissa Hart, Learning from
Wal-Mart, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 355, 373–74 (2006) (discussing the importance and
legitimacy of class action suits challenging big box employers’ use of subjective and decentralized
decision making as enabling the operation of cognitive bias).
107
Working Families Flexibility Act, H.R. 1274, 111th Cong. § 4(b)(1)(A) (2009).
108
See Jason P. Mitchell et al., Contextual Variations in Implicit Evaluation, 132 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 455, 456 (2003) (summarizing research indicating that “contextual factors
can systematically shift self-reported attitudes and beliefs”).
109
Brian S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 842, 845 (2001); see also Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G.
Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images
of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 806 (2001)
(suggesting that exposure to pictures of admired and disliked exemplars can reduce automatic
preference for white over black Americans).
110
See Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 214–16 (describing how achieving an optimal outcome may
require individuals to limit acquisition of information that is costly to discover, resulting in “rational
ignorance”).
111
See Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1158–67 (1999)
(summarizing experimental research that calls into question the human ability to correct or control for
the operation of discriminatory bias).
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overshadows the thoughtful process the Act ought to encourage.
In this
way, the WFFA may go both too far and not far enough in its efforts to
ensure procedural fairness. The Act identifies the precise steps required of
employers and imposes a penalty in the event those steps are not
followed.113 It fails, however, to establish any standard of review by which
employers are to judge applications or to impose any general duty on the
employer in terms of the quality of its vetting process.
Regulatory and judicial interpretation could ultimately fill that gap.
Such has been the case under the ADA, where courts have not only
required parties to participate in the interactive process recommended by
the regulations, but to do so in good faith. Thus, courts have looked to the
quality of the employer’s participation—the speed of its response, its
willingness to experiment with a proposed accommodation , its efforts to
accumulate information, its attentiveness to employee suggestions—to
determine whether the employer meaningfully engaged in the interactive
process with an intent and desire to reach a viable accommodation.114
112
Such critiques have been levied, not without justification, in the context of sexual harassment
law under which an employer must demonstrate that it engaged in preventative and corrective action in
order to avoid liability for a hostile work environment. See, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742, 764–65 (1998) (holding that an employer may avoid liability if it can show that it exercised
reasonable care to prevent, and swiftly remedy, any sexually harassing behavior, and that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive and corrective opportunities that the
employer provided to mitigate the risk of harm to the employee); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (same). The general consensus among commentators is that this rule has resulted
in superficial efforts by employers to deter hostile conduct—efforts that are often credited by courts but
actually do little to eliminate sexual harassment. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a
Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and
Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 1 (2001)
(emphasizing the absence of empirical support for the “widely held and rarely questioned” belief that
corporate anti-discrimination training deters harassment and discrimination and suggesting that such
programs might even polarize workers and undermine legal rights); Anne Lawton, Operating in an
Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197,
198 (2004) (observing that “courts reward employers for developing and distributing nicely worded
harassment policies and procedures,” which do not necessarily deter sexual harassment in the
workplace); John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, and the Disappearance of “Vicarious” Liability: The
Emergence of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for Employers Whose Supervisory
Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1401, 1405 (2002)
(“To trigger [the] safe harbor [under Ellerth and Faragher], all an employer has to do is promulgate a
harassment complaint procedure.”); David Sherwyn et al., Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel
Your “1-800” Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the
Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1267 (2001)
(concluding that the message to be gleaned by employers from lower court rulings post-Ellerth and
Faragher is that “to limit liability [employers] should exercise just enough reasonable care to satisfy a
court, but not enough to make it easy or comfortable for employees to complain of workplace
harassment”). But see Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process, supra note 15, at 48–50
(acknowledging anti-plaintiff results under the Ellerth-Faraghar rule but arguing that these are due to a
misinterpretation and unjustified expansion of the Supreme Court’s decisions by lower courts and do
not suggest the inevitability of “paper compliance” by employers).
113
Working Families Flexibility Act, H.R. 1274, 111th Cong. §§ 4(b)(1)(A)–(M), 7(a)(1) (2009).
114
Compare Salgado-Candelario v. Ericsson Caribbean, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 151, 168–71
(D.P.R. 2008) (finding a triable issue on the employer’s breach of the good faith interactive process
requirement where the plaintiff-employee’s supervisor asked for repeated doctors’ notes, employer’s
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The same type of inquiry could be applied to an employer’s handling
of a request under the WFFA. Indeed, British tribunals interpreting the
U.K. Right to Request Law appear to be doing just that. The decision in
Commotion Ltd. v. Rutty provides an example.115 There, the employeeappellant was a full-time warehouse worker who became the principal
caretaker of her young granddaughter. As a result, she made an application
under the Right to Request Law to reduce her work hours to a part-time
schedule.116 The company met with the employee, per the statute, and
issued a written denial of the request. Among other things, the employer
asserted that there would be a “detrimental impact on performance” if the
request were granted and cited the need to “help create a team spirit by
having a uniform working day.”117 On the employee’s subsequent claim
under the Right to Request Law, the Employment Tribunal held that the
employer had not complied with its statutory requirements.118 Affirming
this decision, the Employment Appeal Tribunal explained:
There is . . . a sliding scale of the considerations which a
Tribunal may be permitted to enter into in looking at such a
refusal. The one end is the possibility that all that the
employer has to do is to state his ground and there can be no
investigation of the correctness or accuracy or truthfulness of
that ground. At the other end is perhaps a full enquiry
looking to see whether the employer has acted fairly,
reasonably, and sensibly in putting forward that ground.
Neither extreme is the position, in our judgment . . . . The
true position . . . is that the Tribunal is entitled to look at the
assertion made by the employer[,] i.e.[,] the ground which he
asserts is the reason why he has not granted the application[,]
and to see whether it is factually correct. . . .
In order for the Tribunal to establish [this] . . . the
Tribunal must examine the evidence as to the circumstances
surrounding the situation to which the application gave rise.
In doing so, the Tribunal are entitled to enquire into what
written replies to the employee’s submissions and those of her physician were repetitive and nonresponsive, and the employer delayed closing an air duct as an accommodation to the employee
because she had not provided a “specific medical order” stating there was a temperature problem), with
Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 871–72 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding no lack of good
faith where the employer sought to meet directly with the plaintiff employee, the employer’s personnel
were “open” and “professional” in talking to the employee’s rehabilitation counselor, and
representatives visited the production line where the employee worked to try to identify appropriate
alternative jobs).
115
Commotion Ltd. v. Rutty, [2006] I.R.L.R. 171 (EAT).
116
Id. at 172–73.
117
Id. at 173.
118
Id. at 175.
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would have been the effect of granting the application.
Could it have been coped with without disruption? What did
other staff feel about it? Could they make up the time?
[A]nd matters of that type.119
Thus, the scope of inquiry for determining a procedural violation under
British law clearly exceeds a checklist review of the employer’s actions.
Applying the standard articulated above, the Appeal Tribunal sanctioned
the Employment Tribunal’s finding in favor of the employee based on the
fact that the employer had produced no information to support its claim
that working as a part-time warehouse assistant was “not feasible.”120 As
the lower tribunal concluded: “There has not been a shred of evidence that
proper enquiry and proper investigation was carried out by the [employer]
when dealing with [the employee’s] request.”121 Thus, it is clear that
courts can and will draw a line between reflexive decisions and thoughtful
process where the law sanctions this approach.122
Finally, there is empirical evidence to support the conclusion that good
process can achieve good outcomes. The most recent available study of
the effects of the Right to Request Law in the United Kingdom, which has
been in place since 2002, found that sixty percent of requests were fully
accepted by employers and that another eighteen percent were partially
accepted.123 The overwhelming majority—eighty-seven percent—were
accepted outright without need for the employee to resort to an appeal.124
The types of requests ranged from requests for reduced hours or part-time
status, to requests for flexible hours or changes in schedule, to requests to
work at home or receive assistance with the employee’s workload.125
There were no statistically significant differences in the rate of employers’
acceptance of proposals based on the type of request.126 In short,
employers willingly deviated from the FTFT norm to accommodate a
range of individual needs in the precise manner requested by a significant
majority of employees.

119

Id. at 177.
Id.
121
Id. at 175.
122
I have presented this argument more expansively in my prior work proposing an
“organizational justice” approach to caregiver equality. Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private
Process, supra note 15, at 56–58 (proposing the adoption of an amendment to the FMLA that would
require employers to engage in a good faith interactive process upon a worker’s request for and return
from leave).
123
HÜLYA HOOKER ET AL., INST. FOR EMP. STUD., EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS RESEARCH SERIES
NO. 58, THE THIRD WORK-LIFE BALANCE EMPLOYEE SURVEY: MAIN FINDINGS 57 (2007), available at
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file38388.pdf.
124
Id. at 58.
125
Id. at 55–56.
126
Id. at 58.
120
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V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I return to the 4/40 work week. What does the recent
popularity of alternative work schedules portend for the future? Ten years
from now, should we expect 4/40 to be the new full-time standard?
Somehow, I suspect not. At the moment, we have no empirical data about
the scope of this trend, only media attention to a few high-profile programs
initiated primarily by government employers. As this Symposium Issue
goes to press, it has been many months since the newspapers have focused
on this particular initiative. As fuel prices stabilize and the economy
recovers, 4/40 may go by the wayside just as it did in the 1970s when
employer interest in novel forms of work restructuring peeked and waned
amidst uncertainty as to its ultimate benefit.127
But whatever happens with 4/40, the intractable problem of work/life
balance remains and grows increasingly urgent. A recent report from the
Executive Office of the President, describes workplace flexibility as an
economic imperative given the changing needs and demographics of a
“21st century workforce.”128 A key point of this Article has been that the
goal of improving the lives of working caregivers transcends any particular
form of work restructuring and must not be assessed as a problem of
proscription. Whether initiated by an employer or imposed by legislation,
any singular, top-down requirement as to the appropriate structure of work
will help some workers and hurt others. What is needed is not one type of
reform so much as an overarching flexibility about possible work structure.
Flexibility is a much harder animal to legislate.
In this way, 4/40 does matter. It is a testament to the possibility of
voluntary efforts by employers to change work structure in ways that
accommodate working caregivers. This is not to say that reliance on
voluntary employer action must supplant other strategies in pursuit of
change. Certainly the strategic use of discrimination laws to root out
stereotypes about the fitness of caregivers for market work must continue,
and it is possible that we will yet see enhanced substantive benefits for
caregivers.129
But employer-sponsored voluntary action can be a
127

See Bird, supra note 57, at ___.
WORK-LIFE BALANCE, supra note 46, at 24–26. While the report does not mention 4/40, it
describes and supports a variety of flexible work arrangements “in terms of when one works, where one
works, or how much one works” including “arrangements such as job sharing, phased retirement of
older workers, and telecommuting, that allow workers to continue making productive contributions to
the workforce while also attending to family and other responsibilities.” Id. at Executive Summary.
129
While the various strategies discussed here do not conflict with one another, I am mindful of
the practical reality that the resources required to enact legislation are not unlimited. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to speculate as to whether the WFFA would ultimately yield greater benefits to
workers than would a substantive enactment like the pending Family and Medical Leave Enhancement
Act, which would expand the FMLA to cover more employers and more routine parental obligations.
See Family and Medical Leave Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 824 111th Cong. (2009). I do believe,
however, that the WFFA is the more likely of the two to gain passage and for this reason would
128
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meaningful part of that process, and its value can be enhanced through the
operation of law. Legislation such as the WFFA, which offers a narrow
and, perhaps for that reason, politically viable approach to incentivizing
employer flexibility, provides a promising example.

recommend that advocates invest their political capital first and foremost in its enactment.

